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statute should be amended to shorten the liberative prescriptive
period to a shorter limit, such as one year." However, the fact that
illegitimates now will be able to bring suit based on this statute
should not control the disposition of the retroactivity issue.
In light of the factors of equity to similarly situated litigants,"8
the more limited effect the decision would have on stability of land
titles and the orderly disposition of property, the avoidance of stale
claims in proceedings to establish filiation, and minimal interference
with the rights of third persons, it is respectfully submitted that the
date of Sidney Brown's death is the most logical and most equitable
choice available.
It should be recognized that the decision in Brown, whatever its
ultimate application, can be viewed as a substantial development in
the area of illegitimate's rights in Louisiana intestate succession
law. The case's impact on intestate successions certainly will be
realized and probaby will influence changes in related areas of the
law, including testate successions and the concept of forced
heirship. 9 In view of these far-reaching effects, it is extremely
important that the extent of retroactive effect of the decision in
Succession of Brown be clarified as soon as possible.
Vance A. Gibbs
THE SUPERVISOR AS AN AMERICAN HOSTAGE:
Belcher Towing Company v. NLRB
Captain Frank Mosso of the Belcher Towing Company was
discharged after failing to report union activity aboard the company-
77. In this way a third person would obtain good title in one year from the date of
the judgment of possession rather than ten years. This limited period would help to
remove some of the uncertainty surrounding title to immovable property.
78. Succession of King, No. 7,612 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980), would present a difficult
factual situation to the court. An illegitimate child, whose birth certificate named King
as the father, and who had always been recognized publicly as King's child, claimed
she was an acknowledged illegitimate and attacked the constitutionality of article 919.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeal did not decide the issue of the constitutionality of
the provision, finding that such a constitutional challenge must be raised at trial. The
court dismissed the child's claim. It appears that the court would consider the case res
judicata as to the child in King and would deny any rights in her father's intestate suc-
cession.
79. For a discussion of the effects of the Brown decision on other areas of Loui-
siana succession law, see Comment, Another Look at Louisiana Succession Law: The
Ramifcation8 of Succession of Brown, 41 LA. L. REv. 1256 (1981).
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owned vessel that he commanded.' One aspect of the no-solicitation
rule that the Belcher Towing Company enforced was a requirement
that supervisory employees, such as tugboat captains like Mosso,
report all union activity aboard the Belcher vessels that they com-
manded.2 In an action brought by Mosso's union' against the towing
company, the hearing examiner found that Mosso indeed had been
discharged for failing to report union activity to the Belcher
management.4 Nevertheless, the hearing examiner reasoned that
Mosso's discharge could not be termed a violation of section 8(a)(1) of
the National Labor Relations Act5 without a "prior definitive and
final finding that [Belcher's] alleged unlawful 'no-solicitation' rule
was in fact an unfair labor practice."' The National Labor Relations
Board adopted the hearing examiner's conclusions about the reason
1. On October 6, 1975, while Mosso was ashore making a telephone call, Mr.
Wayland Burgess climbed aboard Mosso's tug. At the time, the tug was docked in Port
Everglades, Florida. Burgess was a union organizer, a representative of Local 333 of
the United Marine Division of the International Longshoremen's Association, AFL-
CIO. When Mosso returned, Burgess introduced himself. After chatting with Burgess
for a short time, Mosso asked him to leave: "For crying out loud, come on, get out of
here before you get the crew in trouble." NLRB v. Belcher Towing Co., 238 N.L.R.B.
No. 63 (Sept. 27, 1978), at 37. Mosso did not report Burgess' visit to the Belcher
management, although he knew that making such a report was one of his duties as a
supervisor. Mosso had reasons for failing to mention Burgess' visit: "I had believed it
was against the Constitution and the laws to inform on the men who were trying to
get a union to protect them." Id. at 36. Mosso was fired on October 10, 1975. Id. at 35.
2. Id. at 35.
3. Mosso was represented by the International Longshoremen's Association. The
union complained that Mosso's dismissal represented a violation of section 8(a)(1) of the
National Labor Relations Act. Besides this complaint, several other allegations of
unfair labor practices were made against Belcher. The Marine Engineers Beneficial
Association, also an AFL-CIO affiliate, claimed that Belcher had committed multiple
violations by warning employees that any caught signing union pledge cards would be
fired, by instructing its captains to keep employees under surveillance through the use
of time logs and other reports, and by requesting that employees report any contacts
that they had with unions. Also, two employees who claimed that they had been
discharged because of their union activities alleged section 8(a)(3) discriminatory
discharge violations. A complaint consolidating these individual allegations was filed
with the National Labor Relations Board on April 26, 1976. Id. at 3.
4. Id. at 38.
5. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976) provides: "(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for
an employer-(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title." 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976) reads:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to
refrain from any or all such activities.
6. 238 N.L.R.B. No. 63 (Sept. 27, 1978), at 35.
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for Mosso's discharge,7 but decided that there was no need for a
"prior definitive and final finding" that the towing company's no-
soliciaton rule was an unfair labor practice.8 The Board determined
that Belcher's no-solicitation rule was "invalid"9 and that Mosso's
discharge represented an 8(a)(1) violation."0 Affirming the Board's
decision, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that
although supervisors are excluded from the protections that the Act
affords to non-supervisory employees, the discharge of a supervisor
still violates section 8(a)(1) of the Act when a supervisor's discharge
interferes with employee exercise of guaranteed organizational
rights or when the discharge is motivated by a supervisor's refusal
to commit an unfair labor practice. Belcher Towing Company v.
N.L.R.B., 614 F.2d 88 (5th Cir. 1980).
Congress' stated purpose in passing the National Labor Rela-
tions Act of 1935 was to provide legal protection of the "right of
employees to organize and bargain collectively."" There were
economic justifications for providing employees these protections:
The denial by employers of the right of employees to organize
and the refusal by employers to accept the procedure of col-
lective bargaining lead to strikes and other forms of industrial
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 5. The Board also observed that it could not be "gain-said that [Belcher]
unlawfully required its captains to commit unfair labor practices." Id.
10. Id. at 6. The Board ordered Mosso reinstated with backpay. Id. at 7.
11. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, § 1, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version
at 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976)). For what would appear to be a model piece of New Deal
legislation, the N.L.R.A. had difficulty in gaining Congressional approval. For a history
of the N.L.R.A., see Keyserling, The Wagner Act: Its Origin and Current Significance,
29 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 199 (1960). The sponsor of the bill, Senator Robert F. Wagner
of New York, for years acted the part of a modern Ahab, whose monomaniacal concern
was vindicating the organizational and bargaining rights of workers, rather than landing
the great white whale. Like Ahab, Wagner spoke of his concern in lofty terms:
[T~he national labor relations bill does not break with our traditions. It is the next
step in the logical unfolding of man's eternal quest for freedom. For 25 centuries
of recorded time before the machine age we sought relief from nature's cruel and
relentless tyranny. Only 150 years ago did this country cast off the shackles of
political despotism. And today, with economic problems occupying the center of
the stage, we strive to liberate the common man from destitution, from insecurity,
and from human exploitation.
In this modern aspect of a time-worn problem the isolated worker is a plaything
of fate. Caught in the labyrinth of modern industrialism and dwarfed by the size
of corporate enterprise, he can attain freedom and dignity only by cooperation
with other of his group.
Id. at 215-16. Unlike Ahab, and happily for Wagner, Wagner saw the consummation of
his dream in the passage of the Act in 1935. Ahab, of course, was delivered a damp and
unfulfilling death, a victim rather than a victor.
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strife or unrest, which have the intent or necessary effect of
burdening or obstructing commerce .... .
Congress reasoned that this bargaining inequality resulted in
lowered wages and depressed purchasing power for employees.'3 Ac-
cordingly, the Act prohibited an employer to "interfere with,
restrain, or coerce" employees in the exercise of their guaranteed
rights." Moreover, the Act prohibited an employer to "encourage or
discourage membership in any labor organization" by "discrimina-
tion in regard to hire or tenure . . .or any term or condition of
employment .... ." These specific prohibitions upon employer ac-
tions rendered inviolable the employee's right to join a union.
The Act's weaknesses were immediately apparent. Most obvious
to employers was the fact that while the Act prohibited employer
interference with protected employee rights, no such comple-
mentary restrictions were placed on unions.'" A less apparent and
12. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, § 1, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version
at 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976)). This is not quite the present language of the statute. In
1947, the modifier "some" was added before the word "employer" in both instances in
which it appears in the first sentence of the section. The section now reads: "The
denial by some employers of the right of employees to organize and the refusal by
some employers to accept the procedure of collective bargaining ...." Management
Labor Relations Act, ch. 120, Title 1, § 101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976)).
13. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, § 1, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version at
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976)). The language of the statute described the problem in a direct and
specific manner:
The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess
full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who are
organized in the corporate or other forms of ownership association substantially
burdens and affects the flow of commerce, and tends to aggravate recurrent
business depressions, by depressing wage rates and the purchasing power of
wage earners in industry and by preventing the stablization of competitive wage
rates and working conditions within and between industries.
Id.
14. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, § 8, 48 Stat. 452 (1935) (current version
at 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976)). The language of section 8(a)(1) has also remained un-
changed since the original version of the Act was passed.
15. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, § 8, 48 Stat. 452 (1935) (current version
at 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976)) provides: "(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer-(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term
or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in a labor
organization . This language also represents that of the original version of the
Act.
16. See National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, § 8, 49 Stat. 452 (1935) (current
version at 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1976)). In its original form the N.L.R.A. was not given to an
equal section 8 division of employer and labor union prohibitions. The subsections 8(a),
which defines the restrictions placed upon employer actions, and 8(b), which defines
the restrictions placed upon actions by labor unions, did not exist. These distinctions
were made in 1947, when the Taft-Hartley Act amended the N.L.R.A. of 1935. See
Labor Management Relations Act, ch. 120, Title I, section 101, 61 Stat. 140 (1947)
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more complicated problem was that of determining who qualified for
the protections of the Act. The Act contrasted "employees," who
were subject to its protections, with "employers," who were not. It
defined "employer" to include anyone acting in an employer's
interest. 7 Clearly, an individual formally acting in an employer's
interest was not an "employee" subject to the Act's protections.
Yet, the matter of determining at what point an individual began
acting in management's interest was a problem that defied satisfac-
tory resolution.
The position of supervisor was the focal point for determining
where labor's interests ended and where management's interests
began. In 1947, in Packard Motor Car Company v. N.L.R.B.,"' the
United States Supreme Court decided that labor's interests did not
end just short of the supervisory figure. The Court allowed that for
the purposes of the Act, supervisors were to be considered as
(current version at 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1976)). Until 1947, section 8 of the Act concerned
only those employer actions that would affect employees in the free exercise of their
guaranteed rights.
In 1947, Congress provided for the addition of subsection 8(b). This subsection
described those actions on the part of a labor organization that would define an unfair
labor practice. In large part, the restrictions placed on labor organizations mirrored
the restrictions that had been placed already on employers. For instance, 8(b)(1) made
it an unfair labor practice for a labor organization to "restrain or coerce (A) employees
in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 or ... (B) (to restrain or coerce)
an employer in the selection of his representatives for the purposes of collective
bargaining or the adjustment of grievances." 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1) (1976). And section
8(b)(2) prohibited a union to "cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate
against an employee in violation of subsection (a)(3) .... 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1976). In
line with these changes, Taft-Hartley also added a paragraph to section 1 of the Act.
The language of this paragraph describes how unfair labor practices on the part of
some labor organizations have the effect of obstructing commerce:
Experience has . . . demonstrated that certain practices by some labor
organizations, their officers, and members have the intent or the necessary effect
of burdening or obstructing commerce by preventing the free flow of goods in
such commerce through strikes and other forms of industrial unrest or through
concerted activities-which impair the interest of the public in the free flow of such
commerce. The elimination of such practices is a necessary condition to the
assurance of the rights guaranteed herein.
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
17. Section 2(2) of the original Act provided that "the term 'employer' includes
any person acting in the interest of an employer ...." National Labor Relations Act,
ch. 372, § 2, 49 Stat. 450 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1976)). The defini-
tion of "employee" has remained unchanged: "The term 'employee' shall include any
employee, and shall not be limited to the employees of a particular employer." Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, § 2, 49 Stat. 450 (1935) (current version at 29
U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976)).
18. 330 U.S. 485 (1947). This decision was soon legislatively negated by the
passage of the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947.
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employees, rather than as management figures. 9 In dissent, Justice
Douglas claimed that the majority view tended to "obliterate the
line between management and labor."'  Douglas reasoned that if
supervisors could be considered as employees within the meaning of
the Act, so could "vice-presidents, managers, assistant managers,
assistant superintendents," and anyone else, save company direc-
tors.2
The Packard Motor Car Company decision particularly, and the
structural imbalance of the Act to the disadvantage of employer
rights in a more general sense, influenced the passage of the Labor
Management Relations Act, or the Taft-Hartley Act, of 1947.22 Taft-
Hartley amended the National Labor Relations Act significantly,
specifically excluding supervisors from the protections of the Act"3
and placing unions under several of the same restrictions that the
earlier version of the Act had placed on employers.24 At the same
time, Taft-Hartley broadened the protected rights of employees by
securing for them the right to refrain from participating in any
organizational or bargaining activities."
The practical reason that the Packard Motor Car Company deci-
sion frustrated employers and employer sympathizers was that the
Court had made it impossible for employers to consider any
employees, especially supervisors, as loyal to the employers. Both
the Senate and the House Reports on Taft-Hartley focused on the
19. Id. at 488.
20. 330 U.S. at 494 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Douglas argued that the majority
view tended to "emphasize that the basic opposing forces in industry are not manage-
ment and labor but the operating groups on the one hand and the stockholder and
bondholder group on the other." Id. Douglas was concerned that the result of the deci-
sion would be that the "struggle for control or power between management and labor
[would become] secondary to a growing unity in their common demands on ownership."
Id.
21. Id.
22. Labor Management Relations Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947). For a view of
the political machinations and maneuverings that led to the passage of the Taft-
Hartley Act, see Reilly, The Legislative History of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 285 (1960).
23. Taft-Hartley added language to section 2(3) of the Act, which removed from
the definition of "employee" "any individual employed as a supervisor." Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act, ch. 120., Title I, § 101, 61 Stat. 137 (1947) (current version at 29
U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976)).
24. See note 16, supra.
25. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976). Taft-Hartley expanded the protected rights of
employees originally listed in section 7 by adding language that guaranteed employees
the right to "refrain from any or all of such activities .... " Labor Management Rela-
tions Act, ch. 120, Title I, section 101, 61 Stat. 140 (1947) (current version at 29 U.S.C.
§ 157 (1976)).
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need for a loyal agent, regardless of whether he represented
management or labor. 6
The Board and the reviewing courts came to recognize that
though supervisors were excluded from the Act's protections, an
employer action against a supervisor as significant as a dismissal
might nevertheless constitute an unfair labor practice. The theory
developed that such an unfair labor practice occurred when the
dismissal of a supervisor had a coercive effect on employees in the
exercise of their guaranteed rights of organization and bargaining. 7
But just when the dismissal of a supervisor coerces employees in
the exercise of their guaranteed rights is a question that remains to
be resolved with any certainty.
The reason that the question has not been resolved satisfactorily
is that the Board and the reviewing courts have used dissimilar
tests to determine when the dismissal of a supervisor has coerced
employees in the exercise of their protected rights. Under one view,
there is no coercion until an employer dismisses a supervisor who
has refused to obey the employer's instructions to commit an unfair
26. The Senate Report on Taft-Hartley observed: "it is natural to expect that
unless this Congress takes action, management will be deprived of the undivided loyalty
of its foremen. There is an inherent tendency to subordinate (management's) interests
wherever they conflict with those of the rank and file." SENATE COMM. ON LAB AND PUB.
WELFARE, REPORT ON THE FED. LAB. RELATIONS ACT OF 1947, S.R. Doc. No. 105, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. 5.
The House Report on Taft-Hartley openly criticized the Board for changing the law
in Packard Motor Car Co. As the Senate Report, the House Report focused on the
need for a loyal agent:
What this bill does is to say what the law has always said until the Labor board,
in the exercise of what it modestly calls its "expertness," changed the law: That
no one, whether employer or employee, need have as his agent one who is
obligated to those on the other side, or one whom, for any reason, he does not
trust.
HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. AND LAB., REPORT ON THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT,
1947, H.R. Doc. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 17.
27. NLRB v. E. Anthony & Sons, Inc., 70 N.L.R.B. 717, 720-21 (1946), enforced,
163 F.2d 22 (D.C. Cir. 1947). Since the Board found that several supervisors had been
discharged discriminatorily, technically only an 8(3) violation was involved. 70 N.L.R.B.
at 720. Still, the Board went on to observe that:
The discharge of supervisory employees under circumstances which suggest no
motivation other than hostility to any union activity, as such, operates as a warn-
ing to all employees of the danger attached to adherence to a union, and hence
generally discourages union membership. The effect of the discharges of [the
supervisors] was to discourage union membership among all employees.
Id. at 720-21. For a chronological overview of the Board's actions in cases involving the
effects of the discharge of a supervisor on employees, see Hament, Are Instructions to
Supervisors to Commit Unfair Labor Practices Unlawful Per Se?, 26 LAB. L.J. 281
(1975).
1334 [Vol. 41
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labor practice."8 The crucial elements of this view are the dismissal,
the supervisor's refusal, and the instructions to commit an unfair
labor practice. At times the Board and the courts have maintained
that even if the supervisor were dismissed for refusing to commit an
unfair labor practice, as long as the employees did not know the
reason for the dismissal, there was no coercio-n. At other times the
28. The cases that follow involve situations wherein a supervisor was fired for
refusing to commit an unfair labor practice. In every instance the Board charged the
employer with committing an unfair labor practice on the theory that the dismissal
had coerced employees in the free exercise of their guaranteed rights. NLRB v.
Belcher Towing Co., 238 N.L.R.B. No. 63 (Sept. 27-, 1978), enforced, 614 F.2d 88 (5th
Cir. 1980); NLRB v. Elder-Beerman Stores Corp., 173 N.L.R.B. 566 (1968), enforced, 415
F.2d 1375 (6th Cir. 1969); NLRB v. I.D. Lowe, d/b/a Thermo-Rite Mfg. Co., 157 N.L.R.B.
310 (1966), enforced, 406 F.2d 1033 (6th Cir. 1969); NLRB v. General Engineering, Inc.,
131 N.L.R.B. 648 (1961), enforced as modified, 311 F.2d 570 (9th Cir. 1962); NLRB v
Talladega Cotton Factory, Inc., 106 N.L.R.B. 295 (1953), enforced, 213 F.2d 209 (5th Cir.
1954); NLRB v. Vail Mfg. Co., 61 N.L.R.B. 181 (1945), enforced, 158 F.2d 664 47th Cir.
1947).
More significantly, there have been cases wherein a supervisor has not b~en fired
for refusing to commit an unfair labor practice. The Board has decided that abs6nt a
dismissal for such a refusal there is no violation. See NLRB v. Bedford Discounters,
Inc., 204 N.L.R.B. 509, 513 n.21 (1972); NLRB v. Florida Builders, Inc., 111 N.L.R.B. 786
(1955) (affirmed by NLRB v. General Engineering, Inc., 131 N.L.R.B. 648, 649 (1961)).
The concern, both in cases where a supervisor has and has not been fired, is with
the coercive effect on employees. In NLRB v. E. Anthony & Sons, Inc., 70 N.L.R.B.
717 (1946), the Board noted that the dismissal of the supervisors operated "as a warn-
ing to all employees of the danger attached to adherence to a union." Id. at 720. In
Vail Mfg. Co., the Board considered the small size of the plant and decided that the
employees probably knew of the reason for the dismissal of the supervisor. 61 N.L.R.B
at 183. Thus, there was coercion. Id. In the instant case, the Board reasoned that
because of both Mosso's discharge and the "obvious and necessary effects of this action
on employees (particularly those under Mosso's supervision)," 238 N.L.k.B. No. 63 at 6,
there was prohibited employee coercion. Id. Yet, when the supervisor's refusal hag not
resulted in a dismissal, the Board has not found coercion. For example, when a super-
visor failed to comply with his employer's orders to supply him with the names of pro-
union employees, the Board found no employee coercion, probably because he was not
dismissed for this failure. NLRB v. Empire Pencil Co., 86 N.L.R.B. 1187, 1190 n.6
(1949), enforced, 187 F.2d 334 (6th Cir. 1951).
29. In NLRB v. General Engineering, Inc., 131 N.L.R.B. 648 (1961), enforced as
modified, 311 F.2d 570 (9th Cir. 1962), the Board considered a situation wherein a
supervisor was fired for refusing to support the pretext that his employer advanced to
explain what actually was a discriminatory discharge. The Board decided that the
dismissal of the supervisor represented an 8(a)(1) violation:
It is well settled that the discharge of a supervisor for refusing to engage in the
unfair labor practice of thwarting the employees' union activities violates Section
8(a)(1) of the Act, as the net effect thereof is to cause employees reasonably to
fear that the employer would take similar action against them if they continued to
support the Union.
131 N.L.R.B. at 650. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to impute employee
knowledge of the reason for the supervisor's discharge and reversed the Board: "IT]he
record evidence is insufficient to support a finding or to sustain An inference that any
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Board and the courts have found the dismissal itself, apart from any
evidence of employee knowledge, sufficient to define coercion. 0 So,
under either view of employee knowledge, the operative theory is
one of effective coercion. It is this discrete employer action of
dismissing the supervisor that causes and defines the coercion.
What is most significant about this theory is that the mere giving of
instructions to a supervisor to commit an unfair labor practice does
not constitute a violation. Beyond that, if the supervisor refuses to
carry out the instructions, there is still no coercion until the
employer dismisses him.
The alternative theory that the Board and the courts have
employed is one of attempted coercion." Under this theory, the
mere giving of instructions to commit an unfair labor practice is suf-
ficient to define a coercion of employee rights.32 There need be no
employee knew or could have known of the motivation for [the supervisor's]
discharge." 511 F.2d at 574.
30. When a supervisor was dismissed for refusing to spy on the union activities of
company employees, the Board found that the dismissal was unlawful "without regard
to employee knowledge" (of the reason for the dismissal). NLRB v. Elder-Beerman
Stores Corp., 173 N.L.R.B. 566, 566 (1968), enforced, 415 F.2d 1375 (6th Cir. 1969). In a
footnote the Board overruled NLRB v. General Engineering, Inc., 131 N.L.R.B. 648
(1961), to the extent that it was inconsistent with its opinion in this decision. 173
N.L.R.B. at 566 n.4. Later, in a similar situation-supervisor dismissed for refusing to
engage in unlawful surveillance-the Board quoted Elder-Beerman Stores, Corp. for
the proposition that such a dismissal is an unfair labor practice without regard to
employee knowledge of the reason for dismissal. NLRB v. GTE Automatic Electric,
Inc., 204 N.L.R.B. 716, 722 (1973).
31. The Board has found an 8(a)(1) violation when an employer instructed a super-
visor to commit an unfair labor practice. NLRB v. Cannon Electric Co., 151 N.L.R.B.
1465 (1965); NLRB v. H.N. Thayer Co., 99 N.L.R.B. 1122 (1952), enforced as modified,
213 F.2d 748 (1st Cir. 1954) (decision was also rejected by NLRB v. Florida Builders,
Inc., 111 N.L.R.B. 786, 787 (1955), which rejection was affirmed by NLRB v. General
Engineering, Inc., 131 N.L.R.B. 648, 649 (1961), enforced as modified, 311 F.2d 570 (9th
Cir. 1962)); NLRB v. Dixie Shirt Co., Inc., 79 N.L.R.B. 127 (1948), enforced, 176 F.2d
969 (4th Cir. 1949) (decision rejected by implication when H.N. Thayer Co. was re-
jected by Florida Builders, Inc.).
32. In NLRB v. Dixie Shirt Co., Inc., 79 N.L.R.B. 127 (1948), enforced, 176 F.2d
969 (4th Cir. 1949), the Board observed that such instructions described an unfair labor
practice because the employer's conduct in giving the instruction was "reasonably
calculated ... to interfere with the free exercise of employee rights under the Act." 79
N.L.R.B. at 128. This view was echoed in NLRB v. H.N. Thayer Co., 99 N.L.R.B. 1122
(1952), enforced as modified, 213 F.2d 748 (1954). The H.N. Thayer Co. Board clearly
stated that regardless of whether the instructions to engage in unlawful surveillance
were carried out, the instructions themselves were unlawful because "they
constitut(ed) an attempt to obtain the kind of information which can be used ... for no
other purpose than to interfere with the employees' right to self organization." 99
N.L.R.B. at 1125. Finally, in NLRB v. Cannon Electric Co., 151 N.L.R.B. 1465 (1965),
the Board considered an employer's instructions to his supervisors and said that "the
tendency of [the employer's] conduct justifies outlawing it." Id. at 1469.
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dismissal, as the employer's manifested intention to commit an un-
fair labor practice through the person of the supervisor signifies
prohibited coercion. Under this theory the Board has been satisfied
to focus on the implications of such employer conduct: "The test is
whether [the employer] engaged in conduct reasonably calculated or
tending to interfere with the free exercise of employee rights under
the Act."3
Even before Taft-Hartley was passed, the Board recognized that
the dismissal of a supervisor could have a coercive effect on
employees. In 1945, in N.L.R.B. v. Vail Manufacturing Company,"
the Board faced a situation wherein a supervisor was dismissed for
failing to falsify the voting list from a union representation election.
Because the plant was small, the Board said, it was reasonable to
assume that the employees knew why the supervisor had been
dismissed.35 And once employee knowledge was inferred, the Board
noted that it also was reasonable to assume that the employees
would thereafter be hesitant to engage in union activities for fear of
being fired." In practical terms Vail established a standard of effec-
tive interference. By imputing employee knowledge of the reason
for the supervisor's dismissal, the Board decided that the dismissal
had the effect of coercing employee rights to the extent prohibited
by section 8(a)(1) of the Act.37
Yet, three years later, when the Board decided N.L.R.B. v. Dixie
Shirt Company, Inc.,3 not only did the standard for establishing
coercion change, but employee knowledge was not even mentioned
as a factor to be considered. In Dixie Shirt a supervisor who had
been directed to find which employees had been responsible for
starting an employee union refused to carry out those orders. The
supervisor was not fired. Still, the Board found an 8(a)(1) violation by
focusing on the employer's intent, rather than on the effect of his ac-
tions:
The [employer] . ..attempted to interfere with its employee's
right to self-organization, for the information sought could have
been used for no other purpose but such interference. The fact
33. NLRB v. Dixie Shirt Co., Inc., 79 N.L.R.B. 127, 128 (1948), enforced, 176 F.2d
969 (4th Cir. 1949).
34. 61 N.L.R.B. 181 (1945), enforced, 158 F.2d 664 (7th Cir. 1947).
35. 61 N.L.R.B. at 183.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. 79 N.L.R.B. 127 (1948), enforced, 176 F.2d 969 (4th Cir. 1949) (decision rejected
by implication when NLRB v. H.N. Thayer Co, 99 N.L.R.B. 1122 (1952), enforced as
modified, 213 F.2d 748 (1st Cir. 1954), was rejected by NLRB v. Florida Builders, Inc.,
111 N.L.R.B. 786 (1955)).
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that the [employer's] attempt did not succeed does not excuse
the violation. The test is whether the employer engaged in con-
duct reasonably calculated or tending to interfere with the free
exercise of employee rights under the Act.39
The departure from Vail is unmistakable. In Dixie Shirt the Board
adopted an attempted interference standard on the theory that the
intention to commit an unfair labor practice constructively coerces
employees in the exercise of their protected rights. °
Within a year the Board had disregarded the language of Dixie
Shirt. In N.L.R.B. v. Empire Pencil Company,41 a 1949 case, a super-
visor failed to supply his employer with the names of pro-union
employees, despite the employer's request that he do so. The
employer had made the same request to several other supervisors,
who complied with the request. The Board found no 8(a)(1) violation
in the one supervisor's refusal to perform the unlawful sur-
veillance,42 but did find an 8(a)(1) violation in the actions of the super-
visors who performed the surveillance.43 In Empire Pencil, unlike
Dixie Shirt, giving instructions to commit an unfair labor practice
did not constitute an 8(a)(1) violation until those instructions actually
were carried out. If Empire Pencil had employed the logic of Dixie
Shirt, the Board would not have distinguished the supervisor who
failed to perform surveillance from those supervisors who did per-
form surveillance, as the employer's instructions alone would have
been an 8(a)(1) violation. Instead, in Empire Pencil, the Board reviv-
ed the effective interference requirement first supplied by Vail."
The effective interference standard, as revived by Empire Pencil,
held the Board's attention until 1952, when in N.L.R.B. v. H.N.
Thayer Company,45 the Board overruled Empire Pencil.4" In Thayer
the Board returned to the attempted interference standard of Dixie
Shirt.47 Thayer involved a number of supervisors who had been in-
structed to determine which employees where pro-union. The Board
39. 79 N.L.R.B. at 128.
40. Id.
41. 86 N.L.R.B. 1187 (1949), enforced, 187 F.2d 334 (6th Cir. 1951) (decision over-
ruled by NLRB v. H.N. Thayer Co., 99 N.L.R.B. 1122 (1952), enforced as modified, 213
F.2d 748 (1st Cir. 1954)).
42. 86 N.L.R.B. at 1190 n.6.
43. Id. at 1190.
44. See note 34, supra, and accompanying text.
45. 99 N.L.R.B. 1122 (1952), enforced as modified, 213 F.2d 748 (1st Cir. 1954)
(decision was also rejected by NLRB v. Florida Builders, Inc., 111 N.L.R.B. 786 (1955),
which rejection was affirmed by NLRB v. General Engineering, Inc., 131 N.L.R.B. 648
(1961), enforced as modified, 311 F.2d 570 (9th Cir. 1962)).
46. 99 N.L.R.B. at 1125 n.15.
47. See notes 38-39, supra, and accompanying text.
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found an 8(a)(1) violation 8 and said that whether the instructions
were carried out was immaterial:
[S]uch instructions are unlawful . . . whether or not the instruc-
tions are ever carried out ... because they constitute an attempt
to obtain the kind of information which can be used by the
employer for no other purpose than to interfere with the
employees' right to self-organization . . ..
Notwithstanding the firmness and clarity of this statement, the
Board rejected Thayer just three years later."° When a number of
supervisors failed to carry out an employer's instructions to engage
in unlawful surveillance, the Board in N.L.R.B. v. Florida Builders,
Inc.51 refused to find 8(a)(1) employee coercion.2 The Board rejected
Thayer specifically and said that the mere act of giving instructions
to commit an unfair labor practice does not necessarily constitute a
violation of the Act. In other words, the effective interference stand-
ard reappeared.
In one subsequent decision, the Board required not only the
dismissal of a supervisor, but employee knowledge of the reason for
the dismissal as well. This view was articulated by the Board's 1961
decision in N.L.R.B. v. General Engineering, Inc.53 in which a super-
visor was fired for refusing to dismiss certain employees responsible
for union organizing efforts. The Board was careful to point out that
simply giving instructions to commit an unfair labor practice did not
constitute an 8(a)(1) violation when those instructions remained
unexecuted: "[Ulnexecuted instructions to a supervisor to dis-
criminate against employees who are unaware of the instructions do
not have any impact upon the employees and therefore cannot inter-
fere with exercise of the rights guaranteed by . . . . the Act."5
However, inasmuch as the supervisor was fired for this refusal,
48. 99 N.L.R.B. at 1125.
49. Id.
50. NLRB v. Florida Builders, Inc., 111 N.L..B. 786 (1955). Technically, the Board
did not overrule H.N. Thayer Co., but rejected that decision:
[W]e do not adhere to the Board's doctrine enunciated in the Thayer case that an
employer's mere instructions to supervisors to ascertain information concerning
the union activities of employees is violative of the Act, whether or not the in-
structions are accompanied by a direction that unlawful means be used to obtain
the information, and whether or not the instructions are ever carried out.
Id. at 787. Later, the rejection was affirmed in NLRB v. General Engineering, Inc.,
131 N.L.R.B. 648, 649, enforced as modified, 311 F.2d 570 (9th Cir. 1962).
51. 111 N.L.R.B. 786 (1955).
52. Id. at 787. Significantly, none of the supervisors were discharged for their
failures.
53. 131 N.L.R.B. 648 (1961), enforced as modified, 311 F.2d 570 (9th Cir. 1962).
54. Id. at 649.
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there was 8(a)(1) coercion, as the Board believed that the employees
in this situation either knew or could have known of the reason for
the discharge."
But the Thayer doctrine was soon revived. In 1965, the Board
confronted N.L.R.B. v. Cannon Electric Company," wherein several
supervisors had complied with their employer's orders to submit the
names of employees thought to be union activists. Though the Board
imputed employee knowledge of the employer's instructions to the
supervisors, the Board nevertheless determined that there was coer-
cion apart from any necessary finding of employee knowledge.57 The
Board went one step further and resurrected Thayer, at least to the
extent of saying that instructions to supervisors to find the names
of union sympathizers was itself a violation of the Act.'
If Cannon Electric resurrected the attempted interference
theory, the decision did not necessarily do so at the expense of the
effective interference theory. When a supervisor was fired for refus-
ing to commit an unfair labor practice, the Board, in 1968, said that
the firing represented an 8(a)(1) violation, apart from any evidence of
employee knowledge either of the instructions or of the reason for
the discharge. 9 Four years later the Board cited Florida Builders as
55. Id. at 650.
56. 151 N.L.R.B. 1465 (1965).
57. Id. at 1468.
58. Id. at 1469. In a footnote, the Board declined to decide whether its decision
overruled General Engineering, Inc.; in H.N. Thayer Company, the instructions were
not carried out, while in this case they were. Id. at 1469 n.7.
59. NLRB v. Elder-Beerman Stores Corp., 173 N.L.R.B. 566 (1968), enforced, 415
F.2d 1375 (6th Cir. 1969). The Board argued that instructions to the supervisor to
engage in the unlawful surveillance "were an integral part of a plan to discover the
identity of employees engaged in union activity . . . and the discharge of [the super-
visor] was designed to enforce such instructions and thus insure the success of the
plan." 173 N.L.R.B. at 566. The Board concluded that both the instructions to carry out
the surveillance and the dismissal of the supervisor for refusing to comply with the in-
structions "interfered with the rights of employees guaranteed by section 7, and were
violative of section 8(a)(1) of the Act." Id.
This is a curious statement. It seems that Elder-Beerman Stores Corp. can be
used as authority for two propositions: (1) is it unlawful to dismiss a supervisor if he
refuses to commit an unfair labor practice; and (2) it is unlawful to instruct a super-
visor to engage in prohibited activities. This is not the case. The Board qualified its
statement that instructions to commit an unfair labor practice are unlawful: "We find
it unnecessary in this case to determine the effect on employees' Section 7 rights of in-
structions to supervisors to engage in surveillance where employees are not aware of
the instructions and they are neither executed nor enforced by discharge." Id. at 566
n.4. In other words, the instructions are a violation when they are executed by the
supervisor or when a supervisor is discharged for refusing to comply with the instruc-
tions. The Board found that the instructions to the supervisor in this case "were an in-
tegral part of a plan to discover the identity of employees engaged in union activity."
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authority for the proposition that the Act is not violated when a
supervisor fails to comply with an employer's instructions to commit
an unfair' labor practice."0 One month later, the Board cited Cannon
Electric as support for the proposition that instructions to a super-
visor to commit an unfair labor practice violate the Act, even absent
evidence of supervisor compliance.6
In Belcher Towing the supervisor, Captain Frank Mosso, had
been instructed to report all union activity aboard his vessel. The
Board determined that, given the general context of the company's
behavior, the instructions to Mosso represented instructions to
engage in unlawful surveillance. The Board noted that a supervisor
cannot be fired for refusing to commit an unfair labor practice and
that Mosso was fired "precisely because he failed to comply suffi-
ciently with (Belcher's) illegal demand."" Because of Mosso's
dismissal and the "obvious and necessary effects of this action on
employees (particularly those under Mosso's supervision),"'3 the
Board found that the company had violated section 8(a)(1) of the
Act. 4 As authority, the Board relied on N.L.R.B. v. I.D. Lowe 5 and
on N.L.R.B. v. Talladega Cotton Factory, Inc.,6 which involve
the dismissal of a supervisor who refused to commit an unfair labor
practice.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the Board's decision
by reiterating that though supervisors are not protected directly by
the Act, the dismissal of a supervisor still can constitute a violation
when motivated by the supervisor's refusal to commit an unfair
173 N.L.R.B. at 566. It is rare that an employer's instructions to a supervisor to
commit an unfair labor practice are not part of a plan to interfere with or coerce
employees in the exercise of their protected rights. And if the discharge of a super-
visor who refuses to comply with the employer's instructions is not an attempt to
carry out the employer's specific scheme-which, under Elder-Beerman Stores Corp.,
defines a situaton when the instructions themselves become a violation-that
discharge is still a violation under a normal effective interference analysis. It makes no
difference whether the discharge was done specifically to effect an unlawful scheme, or
if the discharge simply resulted from a supervisor's refusal to commit an unfair labor
practice. If a supervisor is dismissed for refusing to commit an unfair labor practice,
there is a violation. It is not important how closely related the dismissal is to effecting
the particular unlawful scheme that the employer intended.
Also, the Board overruled General Engineering, Inc., to the extent it was inconsis-
tent with the Board's view of employee knowledge. Id.
60. NLRB v. Bedford Discounters, Inc., 204 N.L.R.B. 509, 513 n.21.
61. NLRB v. GTE Automatic Electric, Inc., 204 N.L.R.B. 716, 721-22 (1973).
62. 238 N.L.R.B. No. 63, at 5.
63. Id. at 6.
64. Id.
65. 157 N.L.R.B. 310 (1966), enforced, 406 F.2d 1033 (6th Cir. 1969).
66. 106 N.L.R.B. 295 (1953), enforced, 213 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1954).
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labor practice. 7 The court also agreed with the Board's observation
that the instructions to Mosso represented instructions to engage in
unlawful surveillance. 8 The court said that it was reasonable to
"infer that the employer's use of knowledge obtained by surveillance
enabled him to commit some of the other unfair labor practices
detailed in [the] complaint." 9 So, in the view of the court, "Mosso's
discharge was motivated by his refusal to participate in unlawful
surveillance .... '70
Belcher Towing is an unexceptional application of the current
theory that when a supervisor is dismissed for refusing to commit
an unfair labor practice, employee rights are effectively coerced, and
8(a)(1) is violated. Since the decision defines employee coercion as
the result of a dismissal, rather than as the result of a manifested
intention to coerce employee rights, the standard articulated by
Belcher Towing must be classified within the category of effective
interference. Still, the Board could just as easily have relied on Can-
non Electric to employ the attempted interference standard that
case articulated. In other words, since the Board found that Belcher
had instructed Mosso to commit an unfair labor practice, those in-
structions alone would have constituted prohibited 8(a)(1) coercion
under the Cannon Electric rationale.
The logical implications of the Belcher Towing standard demand
consideration. Under Belcher Towing, there is no 8(a)(1) coercion if
an employer simply instructs a supervisor to commit an unfair labor
practice.7 Nor is there 8(a)(1) coercion if an employer refrains from
dismissing a supervisor who refuses to execute the employer's in-
structions to commit the unfair labor practice. Clearly, under
Belcher Towing, it is possible for an employer to absolve himself
after he has made a commitment to violate the protected rights of
his employees. An employer can avoid being charged with an 8(a)(1)
violation simply by refraining from firing the supervisor who has
disobeyed the employer's instructions.
This analysis of Belcher Towing gives way to other criticisms.
The motivation for amending the National Labor Relations Act to
exclude specifically supervisors from the category of protected
employees was to guarantee employers the loyalty of their super-
visors. However, in the same way that an employer can now expect
67. 614 F.2d at 91.
68. Id. at 91 n.4.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 92.
71. Under the attempted interference standard, these instructions would describe
an 8(a)(1) violation. See notes 31-32, supra, and accompanying text.
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loyalty from his supervisors, a supervisor should be able to expect
that his employer will not ask him to violate the provisions of the
Act. Though a supervisor ultimately must answer to management,
he must work on a daily basis with rank-and-file employees. His effi-
ciency, which is in the employer's undeniable interest, is improved
by a productive relationship with those employees who work directly
with him. If an employer asks a supervisor to commit an unfair
labor practice, such as the unlawful surveillance that was requested
of Mosso in Belcher Towing, the supervisor is compromised imme-
diately. His relationship with those rank-and-file employees who
work directly with him is endangered if he does carry out the
orders; and his relationship with his employer is endangered if he
does not. Under the Belcher Towing rationale, a supervisor con-
ceivably could be made very uncomfortable by an employer who
refrains from dismissing him for a refusal to commit an unfair
labor practice.
The effective interference standard of Belcher Towing fails in
two notable ways. It allows an employer to benefit from his wrong-
doing by refraining from dismissing a supervisor who has refused to
carry out anti-union orders. Also, the Belcher Towing standard pro-
vides an employer no disincentive to instruct supervisors to
commit 8(a)(1) violations. As a result, a supervisor can be compromised
without his employer's suffering unfair labor practice charges.
Neither situation would occur under the attempted interference
theory of Cannon Electric. The Cannon Electric theory maintains
that once an employer instructs a supervisor to commit an unfair
labor practice, there is an imputed coercion of employees in the ex-
ercise of their protected rights. The Board has reasoned that giving
such instructions implies a tendency to interfere with employees in
the exercise of their rights.
The structural problem with the attempted interference stan-
dard is that the language of the Act invites the effective inter-
ference approach, at least in view of employer actions against
employees. In both sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) of the Act, there is no
mention of an "intent" or "attempt" to coerce or discriminate. Pro-
hibited conduct is defined in terms of effective coercion or
discrimination. Some writers even have suggested that there are ad-
vantages in the fact that the Act requires no proof of intent or
motive, because a less onerous burden is placed on the adjudicatory
system. 2 In a perfectionist's vacuum, this might be so. In practice,
72. Christensen & Svanoe, Motive and Intent in the Commission of Unfair Labor
Practices: The Supreme Court and the Fictive Formality, 77 YALE L.J. 1269, 1269
(1968).
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however, the Board and the courts have viewed anti-union animus
either as an element of an 8(a)(3) violation"3 or as a factor to be con-
sidered in determining an 8(a)(1) violation.4 For instance, in N.LR.B.
v. Erie Resistor Corp."5 the Court decided that proof of anti-union
motivation could turn an apparently lawful employer practice into
an 8(a)(3) violation." Similarly, in N.L.R.B. v. Brown," the court ruled
that absent findings of "hostile motive," an apparently legitimate
employer action could not be translated into an 8(a)(1) violation."
The Belcher Towing situation-an employer's instructing a
supervisor to commit an unfair labor practice-does not involve an
apparently lawful employer practice. The problem of divining
73. For instance, in NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967), the
Supreme Court noted that the dietermination of an 8(a)(3) violation "normally turns on
whether the discriminatory conduct was motivated by an antiunion purpose." Id. at 33.
And in American Ship Bldg. Company v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965), the Court allowed
that "Jilt has long been established that a finding of violation under this section (8(a)(3))
will normally turn on the employer's motivation." Id. at 311. See Christensen &
Svanoe, supra note 85; Shieber & Moore, Section 8(a)(3) Of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act: A Rationale-Part II Encouragement or Discouragement of Membership in
any Labor Organization and the Significance of Employer Motive, 33 LA. L. REV. 1
(1972).
Strictly speaking, there need not always be an inquiry into motive to prove an
8(a)(3) violation. In NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278 (1964), the Court said that the Board
"need not inquire into employer motivation to support a finding of an unfair labor prac-
tice where the employer conduct is demonstrably destructive of employee rights and is
not justified by the service of significant or important business ends." Id. at 282.
74. American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965), provided the Court the
opportunity to determine whether an employer's use of a temporary layoff of
employees after a bargaining impasse was an 8(a)(1) violation or a valid means of bring-
ing economic pressure to support the employer's bargaining position. The Court was
concerned specifically with the problem of hostile motive on the part of the employer:
There was no evidence and no finding that the employer was hostile to its
employees' banding together for collective bargaining or that the lockout was
designed to discipline them for doing so. It is therefore inaccurate to say that the
employer's intention was to destroy or frustrate the process of collective bargain-
ing.
Id. at 308-09. The Court then said that it was important to distinguish employer inten-
tion to support his bargaining position from employer hostility to the collective
bargaining process: "Proper analysis of the problem demands that the simple intention
to support the employer's bargaining position as to compensation and the like be
distinguished from a hostility to the process of collective bargaining which could
suffice to render a lockout unlawful." Id. at 309. Finding that the lockout was a
legitimate bargaining tactic and that there was no evidence of employer hostility
toward the employees, the Court determined that no 8(a)(1) violation had been commit-
ted. Id. at 311.
75. 373 U.S. 221 (1963).
76. Id. at 227.
77. 380 U.S. 278 (1964).
78. Id. at 286.
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motivation to prove a violation does not exist when an employer has
committed himself to violating, through a supervisor, the protected
rights of the employees. By giving the instructions, the employer
not only has manifested an intention, but also has done all that he
possibly can to bring about the violation. The success of the effort
depends on whether or not the supervisor obeys the employer's
orders. Despite this, the effective interference standard, as
employed in Belcher Towing and the line of cases before it,
disregards the important fact that the employer's manifested inten-
tion is at the same time an act that tends to violate the protected
rights of employees. And the tendency to violate employee rights
has long been sufficient to constitute an 8(a)(1) violation. 9
The Belcher Towing standard is problematical. It does nothing
other than provide the employer an opportunity to avoid violating
the Act by refraining from dismissing the supervisor who refuses to
obey his instructions. For the employer who is willing to risk Board
charges if a supervisor does follow instructions to commit an unfair
labor practice, the Belcher Towing standard provides something like
an incentive. The employer knows that if his supervisor refuses to
follow the instructions, the employer can avoid unfair labor practice
violations by keeping the supervisor on the payroll. At the same
time, Cannon Electric and its theory of attempted interference re-
mains operative. A blanket application of Cannon Electric not only
would remove employer incentive to coerce employees through the
actions of a supervisor, but also would remove employer opportunity
for self-absolution. In the area of labor law, absolution remains in
the exclusive province of the Board.
David Michael Hunter
League of Women Voters v. The City of New Orleans:
STANDING OR POLITICAL QUESTION?
The League of Women Voters of New Orleans, a nonprofit organi-
zation, and two New Orleans taxpayers sued for a writ of manda-
79. In 1948, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals said that the test for determining
an 8(a)(1) violation is whether "the employer engaged in conduct which, it may
reasonably be said, tends to interfere with the free exercise of employee rights under
the Act." NLRB v. Ford, 170 F.2d 735, 738 (6th Cir. 1948). This proposition was
reiterated by the seventh cicuit eleven years later: "No proof of coercive intent or
effect is necessary under section 8(a)(1) of the Act, the test being 'whether the
employer engaged in conduct which, it may reasonably be said, tends to interfere with
the free exercise of employee rights under the Act.'" Time-O-Matic, Inc. v. NLRB, 264
F.2d 96, 99 (7th Cir. 1959).
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